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RESTORATION COSTS AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEASURE OF
SEVERANCE DAMAGES IN EMINENT
DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS
When a portion of a landowner's real property is taken in con-
demnation proceedings,' the landowner, by state and federal constitu-
tions, is guaranteed "just compensation" for his loss. 2 In determining
"just compensation" in cases of partial taking, the California courts
have resorted to a "value plus damages" evaluation.3  An award de-
termined by the application of this method includes compensation for
(1) the fair market value of the property taken,4 and (2) the decline in
1 For there to be a partial taking, the original piece of property (con-
sisting of the part condemned and the part remaining) must have been in
unity of use and ownership and the parts must have been contiguous. People
ex Tel. Department of Pub. Works v. Dickinson, 230 Cal. App. 2d 932, 41 Cal.
Rptr. 427 (1964). But see United States v. Honolulu Plantation Co., 182
F.2d 172, 178 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 820 (1950).
2 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V: "[N]or shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation." E.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 14:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation... ." Only in New Hampshire and North Carolina is there no
express constitutional requirement of just compensation. However, these con-
stitutions have been interpreted to require it. Opinion of the Justices, 66 N.H.
629, 33 A. 1076 (1891); Mount Washington Rd. Co., 35 N.H. 134, 141-42
(1857); Staton v. Norfolk & C.R.R., 111 N.C. 278, 16 S.E. 181 (1892); see
Comment, Eminent Domain Valuation in an Age of Redevelopment: Inci-
dental Damages, 67 YALE L.J. 61 n.1 (1957).
3 E.g., Riverside v. Kraft, 203 Cal. App. 2d 300, 21 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1962).
See generally CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1248(1). "Value plus damages" is one
of three methods for determining the whole award of compensation. For an
explanation of the three methods, see generally 4 P. NICHOLs, THE LAW Or
EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.23 (rev. 3d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as NICHOLS];
1 L. ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF E nx-, DoMAx §§ 49-51 (2d ed.
1953) [hereinafter cited as ORGE]; G. ScmvuTz & E. RAms, CoNDEMNATION
APPRAISAL HANDBOOK 96-100 (1963) [hereinafter cited as ScmWuTz & RAMS].
4 Sacramento S.R.R. v. Heilbron, 156 Cal. 408, 104 P. 979 (1909). Heil-
bron defined market value as the highest price which the property would
bring on the open market with a reasonable time allowed to find a purchaser
who has knowledge of all the uses and purposes for which the property is
suited. Id. at 409, 104 P. at 980. Today the fair market value standard is
virtually the universal method of determining just compensation. See,
e.g., Cole Inv. Co. v. United States, 258 F.2d 203 (9th Cir. 1957); United States
v. 11,360 Acres of Land, 62 F. Supp. 968, 969 (N.D. Cal. 1945); People v.
Thompson, 43 Cal. 2d 13, 27, 271 P.2d 507, 515 (1954); Board of Trustees v.
B.J. Service, Inc., 75 N.M. 459, 406 P.2d 171 (1965). But cf. In re Condemna-
tion of Lands, 250 F. 314, 315 (E.D. Ark. 1918); Note, Compensation for a
Partial Taking of Property: Balancing Factors in Eminent Domain, 72
YALE L.J. 392, 394-95 (1962).
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fair market value of any remaining property due to the severance of
the condemned portion.5
This second item of compensation, "severance damages,"6 ideally
should include reimbursement for incidental damages to the land-
owner. One such incidental damage, which is often ignored when
determining the loss in the fair market value of the retained portion,
is the cost of restoration, i.e., that cost necessarily incurred by the
landowner in restoring his remaining land to a condition similar to
that prior to the condemnation.7 In some situations, the cost of
restoration, and not the decline in the "fair market value," should be
the measure for severance damages. It shall be the objective of this
note to examine those situations in which restoration costs have been
considered by the California courts in measuring severance damages,
and to discuss the validity, if any, of such measurement.
Theory of Incidental Damage8
Though costs of restoration are only one small part of the judicial
concept of incidental damages, it is necessary to set forth some of the
background and theory of this concept in order to understand the
courts' refractory adherance to the fair market value standard.9
Starting with the 1893 Supreme Court decision in Monongahela Nav-
igation Company v. United States,0 both the federal" and the state
1 2
courts have consistently held that the constitutional guarantee of just
compensation applies only to the taking of tangible property interests.
The particular use of the property is considered to affect only the
owner's personal interests. The injury suffered due to the prevention
or hinderance of a particular use is not a taking of a tangible interest
in property, and, therefore, is a noncompensable incidental damage.13
Thus, it will be noticed that just compensation, according to its early
5 E.g., People v. Thompson, 43 Cal. 2d 13, 271 P.2d 507 (1954); see 4
NIcHoLs § 14.1[2].
6 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1248 (2): . . the damages which will accrue
to the portion [of the property] not sought to be condemned, by reason of
its severance from the portion sought to be condemned .... "
7 Riverside v. Kraft, 203 Cal. App. 2d 300, 21 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1962).
8 A leading writer has said that the term incidental damage is one of
convenience rather than logic which encompasses those damages not compen-
sable. 1 ORGEI § 66, at 305. For a full discussion of the various damages
placed in this category, see id. §§ 66-80.
9 Cases cited note 4 supra.
10 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
" E.g., United States v. Building Known as 651 Brannan Street, 55 F.
Supp. 667, 670 (N.D. Cal. 1944).
12 E.g., State H'way Comm'n v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 244-45, 265 P.2d
783, 799 (1954).
13 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893);
United States v. Building Known as 651 Brannan Street, 55 F. Supp. 667, 670
(N.D. Cal. 1944); State H'way Comm'n v. Burk, 200 Ore. 211, 244-45, 265 P.2d
783, 799 (1954).
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interpretation, is for the injury to the property, not to the owner 1 4
State courts have concurred in this interpretation of just com-
pensation 5 and have relegated costs of restoration to the category of
incidental damages, 6 as well as such items as loss of goodwill, 7
loss of profits, 8 moving expenses, 19 prevention of a projected use,20
and circuity of travel.2' As Mr. Justice Frankfurter has stated:
In view . . .of the liability of all property to condemnation for the
common good, loss to the owner of nontransferable values deriving
from his unique need for property or idiosyncratic attachment to it,
like loss due to an exercise of the police power, is properly treated as
a part of the burden of common citizenship.22
Two reasons may be given for the holding in Monongahela that
only tangible property interests are protected by the "just compen-
sation" limitation. The first is historical; the decision came at a time
when there were few eminent domain proceedings, and there was an
abundance of unimproved land. Also, society was relatively unde-
veloped when compared with that of today.23 As a result of these
factors, incidental damages were seldom encountered by the courts,
and the law developed without providing a remedy for them.24
Judicial practicality is the second reason for the Monongahela
holding.25 To allow incidental damages would lead to an entirely sub-
jective measure of damages which would restrict the power of emi-
nent domain. 26 Obviously in eminent domain proceedings the needs
14 Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312 (1893).
Accord, Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949). But see
Case v. State H'way Comm'n, 156 Kan. 163, 165-66, 131 P.2d 696, 698-99
(1942); Grand River Dam Authority v. Gray, 192 Okla. 547, 549, 138 P.2d
100, 103 (1943). See also Heimann v. Los Angeles, 30 Cal. 2d 746, 755, 185
P.2d 597, 602-03 (1947); Ray v. State H'way Comm'n, 196 Kan. 13, 19, 410
P.2d 278, 283, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 820 (1966) (loss of traffic flow is non-
compensable).
15 E.g., Wray v. Knoxville, L.F. & J.R.R., 113 Tenn. 544, 83 S.W. 471
(1904).
16 Evans v. Wheeler, 209 Tenn. 40, 348 S.W.2d 500 (1961).
17 Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 P. 705
(1915). See also 1 ORGFr § 75, at 325-26 n.43, citing many cases to the effect
that loss of good will is noncompensable.
18 Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P.2d 826 (1933); 1 ORGEL § 72.
19 Central Pac. R.R. v. Pearson, 35 Cal. 247 (1865); 1 ORG.L §§ 68-69.
20 Daly City v. Smith, 110 Cal. App. 2d 524, 243 P.2d 46 (1952).
21 Radinsky v. Denver, 159 Colo. 134, 410 P.2d 644 (1966); Ray v. State
H'way Comm'n, 196 Kan. 13, 410 P.2d 278, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 820 (1966).
22 Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
23 See Comment, Eminent Domain Valuation in an Age of Redevelop-
ment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61 (1957).
24 Id. at 65.
25 Incidental damages are arbitrary and speculative and for this reason
the courts will not compensate for them. See 1 ORGEL §§ 69-70, 77.
26 See Comment, Eminent Domain-Temporary Taking-Just Compen-
sation for Altering of Premises, 33 N.Y.U.L. REv. 882, 888 (1958).
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of society and the overriding power of sovereignty prevail, so that
equitable remedies are not available to resolve the problem of sub-
jective damages.2 7 Having no equitable remedy and no proper meas-
ure in law, the Court found incidental damages noncompensable by
adhering to the fair market value standard.28
For these reasons the Court decided that incidental damages are
not compensable. And, by so deciding, the Court also established the
decliny of the fair market value as the standard measure of just
compensation in partial taking cases.
Cost of Restoration as Incidental Damage
Suppose that X is putting his land to its best use as a quarry
when condemnation proceedings are commenced to bisect his land
with a highway. Suppose further that X wants to continue his quarry
operation after completion of the highway, but to do so requires
reconstruction of a conveyor system at a cost of $5,000. In the con-
demnation proceedings, evidence of this restoration cost, which is X's
actual damage, will be inadmissible because it represents incidental
damage. X's just compensation will be based on the loss in the fair
market value of the retained property. This decline in market value
will be proved by showing changes in the rental value2 9 or through
some other form of proof s° equally inappropriate for reflecting X's
true loss due to the condemnation.
27 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 531 (1848):
"In every political sovereign community there inheres necessarily the right
and the duty of guarding its own existence, and of protecting and promoting
the interests and welfare of the community at large. This power and this
duty are to be exerted not only in the highest acts of sovereignty, and in the
external relations of governments; they reach and comprehend likewise the
interior polity and relations of social life, which should be regulated with
reference to the advantage of the whole society. This power, denominated
the eminent domain of the state, is, as its name imports, paramount to all
private rights vested under the government, and these last are, by necessary
implication, held in subordination to this power, and must yield in every
instance to its proper exercise."
28 Cf. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326-30
(1893). See also United States v. 257.654 Acres of Land, 72 F. Supp. 903, 914
(D. Hawaii 1947).
20 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Flintkote Co., 264 A.C.A.
115, 70 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1968).
80 Other methods used to determine market value are: Market Sales
Analysis, Market Rate-of-Return Analysis, Market Cost-Production Analysis,
Indeterminate Market Analysis, and the Ellwood Analysis utilizing the Eli-
wood Tables. These methods of determining market value are treated in de-
detail in ScmWuTz & RAMs, supra note 3, at 27 et seq. For an enlightened
decision where fair market value is discarded where the result would be un-
fair, see Housing Authority v. Savannah Iron & Wire Works, Inc., 91 Ga.
App. 881, 886, 87 S.E.2d 671, 676 (1955): "In determining just and adequate
compensation, under the constitutional provision, market value and actual
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In effect, the refusal to use costs of restoration as the measure of
severance damages in this case has prevented X from continuing to
enjoy the highest use of his land, unless he himself is willing to spend
$5,000. Of course, X could avoid this expense by leasing one part of
his land to another quarrier, but this too would seem to involve a
financial penalty. The courts have made it clear, however, that
"[a]ny increase in the personal difficulties of a landowner . . . by
reason of the taking, apart from [a decrease in] the market value, is
not a proper test of damages ... .*"31 In this hypothetical case,
therefore, X would suffer a substantial but noncompensable loss due
to "personal difficulties."
Not only would this result be inequitable, it would be in direct
conflict with the judicial interpretation of the intent of the eminent
domain clause of the California Constitution, as explained in Los
Angeles v. Harper:32
The clear intention of the constitutional provision is that the
owner of property taken under the power of eminent domain shall be
made whole for his loss and shall be recompensed in an amount of
money equal to the actual loss which he has suffered by reason of
such condemnation. It does not contemplate that such an owner may
make a profit over and above the detriment, expressed in dollars and
cents, that he has sustained.33
Notice should be taken of the dual protection afforded by the
Harper interpretation. On the one hand, the landowner is protected
against actual loss, even to the extent of his costs of restoration.34
On the other, the state is protected against landowners' profiting
from condemnation proceedings. 35 However, when theory is put into
value will ordinarily be synonymous. If they are not, that value which will
give 'just and adequate compensation' is the one to be sought by the jury in
rendering its verdict."
31 People ex Tel. Department of Pub. Works v. Lundy, 238 Cal. App. 2d
354, 359, 47 Cal. Rptr. 694, 697 (1965); see People ex tel. Department of Pub.
Works v. Flintkote, 264 A.C.A. 115, 70 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1968); La Mesa v. Tweed
& Gambrell Planing Mill, 146 Cal. App. 2d 762, 304 P.2d 803 (1956); Daly
City v. Smith, 110 Cal. App. 2d 524, 243 P.2d 46 (1952); Los Angeles County
v. Signal Realty Co., 86 Cal. App. 704, 261 P. 536 (1927).
32 139 Cal. App. 331, 33 P.2d 1029 (1934).
33 Id. at 334, 33 P.2d at 1030 (emphasis added). See also Note, Compen-
sation for a Partial Taking of Property: Balancing Factors in Eminent Do-
main, 72 YALE. L.J. 392, 401 (1962).
34 Los Angeles v. Harper, 139 Cal. App. 331, 334, 33 P.2d 1029, 1030 (1934);
Santa Clara County v. Curtner, 245 Cal. App. 2d 730, 743-44, 54 Cal. Rptr.
257, 265 (1966); People ex tel. Department of Pub. Works v. Hayward Bldg.
Materials Co., 213 Cal. App. 2d 457, 465-67, 28 Cal. Rptr. 782, 787-88 (1963);
Riverside v. Kraft, 203 Cal. App. 2d 300, 303, 21 Cal. Rptr. 425, 427-28 (1962).
35 Los Angeles v. Harper, 139 Cal. App. 331, 334, 33 P.2d 1029, 1030 (1934);
see People ex tel. Department of Pub. Works v. Hayward Bldg. Materials
Co., 213 Cal. App. 2d 456, 28 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1963). See also 1 ORGFri § 7, at
39; CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1248(3): "[I]f the benefit shall be equal to the
damages assessed under subdivision 2 [severance damages], the owner of the
parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken.
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practice through the means of the fair market value standard, a vast
area of incidental damages due to "personal difficulties" is excluded
from compensation.
Why Costs of Restoration Should Be Compensable
Disregarding arguments for the complete rejection of the fair
market value standard and for the compensability of all incidental
damages,3 0 there are clear and cogent reasons why costs of restora-
tion should be compensable. First, the reasons for denying compen-
sation for incidental damages are not applicable to costs of restora-
tion. Secondly, compensation would promote the public policy favor-
ing the free use and enjoyment of land.
MonongaheZa RationaZe Invalid
Historical development was the initial reason given for the re-
fusal to recognize incidental damages. 37  With due regard for the
place of precedent in the law, conditions arising from the complex-
ities of modern society appear to make old rules inappropriate for
today's needs.38 As was noted in the hypothetical example above,39
the fair market value standard may well be inappropriate in the
situation where the sole severance damages are the costs of restora-
tion. Just compensation could not be provided, and, as the courts
have made clear:
[T]he rules for determining value of land taken by condemnation
cannot, from the nature of the case, be inflexible. In each case just
compensation is the goal; and where a rigid application of even a
settled rule will produce injustice it must be departed from, so far as
made necessary by the circumstances of the case.40
Since just compensation is equally the goal in determining severance
damages, it is logical to apply this same rule where costs of restoration
are the only damages incurred. Historial development and precedent,
If the benefit shall be less than the damages so assessed, the former shall be
deducted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages al-
lowed in addition to the value."
30 A change in the law to allow compensability for all incidental damage
would probably have to be made by the legislature. See CAL. EVIDENCE
CODE § 822(e): "[Tihe following matter is inadmissible as evidence and is
not a proper basis for an opinion as to the value of property: ... The influ-
ence upon the value of the property or property interest being valued of any
noncompensable items of value, damage, or injury."
37 See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
38 B. CARDozo, THE NATuRE OF Tim JUDICIAL PRocEss 66 (1921): "Logic
and history and custom have their place. We will shape the law to comform
to them when we may; but only within bounds. The end which the law
serves will dominate them all."
39 See text accompanying notes 29-33 supra.
40 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Auburn Ski Club, 241 Cal.
App. 2d 781, 786, 50 Cal. Rptr. 859, 862-63 (1966), quoting Napa Union High
School Dist. v. Lewis, 158 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 322 P.2d 39, 41 (1958).
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then, are very weak support for use of the fair market value stand-
ard in this situation.
A second argument that is used to deny compensation for damages
is the unavailability of an objective method of calculating this type of
damage.4 1 The invalidity of this argument, when applied to costs
of restoration, is readily apparent. Cost of restoration is always re-
ferable to an observable and previously existing condition, whether
it be a conveyor system, a stream, shrubbery or whatever.4 2
Furthermore, as an alternative standard, costs of restoration are
much more reliable than the completely subjective "intrinsic value"
or "value to the owner" standard which is used when there is no
market value at all. 4 3 In fact, the cost of restoration standard is
probably more objective than the fair market value standard itself,
which, of necessity in the case of a "forced sale,144 is based on highly
speculative considerations. 45 Therefore, in light of the objective na-
ture of the cost of restoration standard and the relative subjectivity
of the fair market value standard, an argument that costs of restora-
tion should not be used as a measure of damage because they are
"subjective" has little force.
Compensation for Costs of Restoration Is Good Public Policy
Awarding compensation for costs of restoration would promote
41 E.g., Arnerich v. Almaden Vineyards Corp., 52 Cal. App. 2d 265, 272,
126 P.2d 121, 124-25 (1942).
42 E.g., United States v. Flood Bldg., 157 F. Supp. 438 (W.D. Cal. 1957)
(replacing walls); Hemmerling v. Tomlev, Inc., 67 Cal. 2d 572, 432 P.2d 697,
63 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1967) (loss of well); People ex tel. Department of Pub.
Works v. Flintkote Co., 264 A.C.A. 115, 70 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1968) (conveyor);
Riverside v. Kraft, 203 Cal. App. 2d 300, 21 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1962) (shrubbery
moved).
43 People v. Ocean Shore R.R., 32 Cal. 2d 406, 427-28, 196 P.2d 570, 584
(1948); Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 211-12, 25 P.2d 826, 832 (1933)
(dictum); see Idaho-Western Ry. v. Columbia Conference, 20 Idaho 568, 119
P. 60 (1911) (college); Illinois Light & Power Co. v. Bedard, 343 fll. 618, 175
N.E. 851 (1931) (utility); Chicago v. Farwell, 286 Ill. 415, 121 N.E. 795 (1918);
Sanitary Dist. v. Pittsburg, F.W. & C. Ry., 216 Ill. 575, 584, 75 N.E. 248, 252
(1905) (railroad terminal) ("The property being devoted to a special and
particular use, the general market value of other property [is] not a criterion
for ascertaining compensation, although it might throw some light on the
actual value.").
44 See BLACK'S LAW DicTioNARY 616 (4th ed. 1951), where the eminent
domain proceeding is characterized as a forced sale: "[When the landowner's]
property is taken under the power of eminent domain, he is compelled to
surrender to the public something above and beyond his due proportion for
the public benefit. The matter is special. It is in the nature of a compulsory
sale to the state."
45 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 375 (1943): "The application
of this concept [fair market value] involves, at best, a guess by informed
persons."
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the public policy favoring the free use and enjoyment of land.46 In
the hypothetical, X was effectively penalized $5,000 because he chose
to use his property personally rather than rent it. This is in direct
contradiction of the above stated public policy. Such a penalty-
whether intended or not--cannot avoid having a substantial and coer-
cive effect on the property owner's use of his land. If costs of restor-
ation were allowed as compensation, however, the owner would be
free of this coercive influence.
In addition, compensation for costs of restoration may enhance
the public policy in favor of the highest and best use and development
of land.47 Again, the hypothetical is illustrative. X had been using
his land to its "highest" extent as a quarry prior to the taking. Sub-
sequent thereto, he desired to continue such use. An award including
his costs of restoration would not only aid the resumption of the
"highest" use, but would encourage it. 48
Recent California Cases Dealing with Costs of Restoration
As was noted earlier, the award of just compensation has a double
aspect: (1) it should cover the landowner's losses, and (2) it should
40 With regard to the public policy favoring free use and enjoyment of
land, see W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS 358 (3d ed. 1964): "[The landowner]
has a privilege to make use of the land for his own benefit, and according to
his own desires, which is an integral part of our whole system of private
property; but it has been said many times by the courts that this privilege is
qualified by a due regard for the interests of others who may be, affected by
it."
47 As to the public policy favoring the highest use of land, see W.
BuraY, REAL PROPERTY 39 (3d ed. 1965) (waste); L. SnvEs, FUTURE INTERESTS
254 (2d ed. 1966) (rule against perpetuities): "The subject matter of the
trust may become what the economist calls 'frozen assets'. This would seem
to be socially undesirable, if it is to continue for too long a time."
48 The courts have said that particular use of the property is not a proper
consideration in the determination of compensation in eminent domain pro-
ceedings. E.g., People v. La Macchia, 41 Cal. 2d 738, 754, 264 P.2d 15, 26
(1953); Santa Ana v. Harlin, 99 Cal. 538, 544, 34 P. 224, 227 (1893); Stockton
& Copperopolis R.R. v. Galgiani, 49 Cal. 139 (1874); Santa Clara- County v.
Curtner, 245 Cal. App. 2d 730, 743, 54 Cal. Rptr. 257, 265 (1966). However,
highest use of the property can properly be considered under the fair market
value standard. E.g., Maricopa County v. Paysnoe, 83 Ariz. 236, 239, 319
P.2d 995, 997 (1957); Spring Valley Water Works v. Drinkhouse, 92 Cal. 528,
534, 28 P. 681, 683 (1891); San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale, 88 Cal. 50,
64, 25 P. 977, 980 (1891); Stockton v. Ellingwood, 96 Cal. App. 708, 723, 275
P. 228, 235 (1929). See also ScmE=Tz & RAms, supra note 3 at 95: "In the
preparation of an estimate of the severance damage that follows from the
taking of a portion of a larger parcel, the first conclusion to be formed is,
' hat is the highest, best and most profitable use to which the property can
be put?' This conclusion is the indispensable first step, for the reason that
the severance damage may be great in the case of one use of the property
and none whatever in another use, even though the physical characteristics
are the same."
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insure the condemnor against payment of excessive awards.4 9 The
proper aim of the courts should be to strike a balance between these
objectives.50 The three recent California cases in which costs of res-
toration were at issue are illustrative of the proper striking of this
balance.
'Riverside v. Kraft51
This case involved a partial taking in a residential district for the
widening of a street. Expert witnesses for the condemnee and con-
demnor based their appraisals of loss on market value. However,
one of the elements the appraisers included in determining fair mar-
ket value was the cost of relocating shrubbery and other improve-
ments on the land not taken. On appeal by the condemnor, the court
held this to be a proper procedure, stating that "[i]n no case did the
opinion of any expert allocate to the cost of moving any greater
dignity than one of the several reasons or evidence used to corroborate
the sum total of the final opinion on fair market value. '52
This case represents the present limit to the use of costs of res-
toration in determining severance damages. Such costs may not be
used as an independent basis for compensation53 but are admissible
only as an evidentiary fact tending to show a decline in fair market
value, i.e., if they
reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion
as to the value of property and [are evidence] which a willing pur-
chaser and a willing seller, dealing with each other in the open market
and with full knowledge of all the uses and purposes for which the
property is reasonably adaptable and available, would take into con-
sideration in determining the price at which to purchase and sell the
property or property interest .... 54
49 See text accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
50 Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 215 Cal. App. 2d
60, 69, 29 Cal. Rptr. 847, 853 (1963).
51 203 Cal. App. 2d 300, 21 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1962).
52 Id. at 304, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 428: "All courts recognize that the
reasons given by an expert may be of utmost importance in weighing the
value of the opinion given. All of the varying circumstances and elements
which a reasonable person would consider in arriving at the final test of
difference in fair market value, including items which fairly afford a test of
the accuracy of the reasons given by the expert appraisers in arriving at their
ultimate conclusions of value, are properly subject of evidentiary proof. Only
in this way can the trial court intelligently test the value or weight of the
experts' opinion on the ultimate difference in fair market value."
53 Id. People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Hayward Bldg. Ma-
terials Co., 213 Cal. App. 2d 457, 28 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1963).
54 CAL. EVIDENCE CODE § 814. See also id. § 820; 2 ORGEL § 190; 5 NiCHOLS
§ 23.2: "Inasmuch as the measure of damages is the decrease in market
value of the land, and the trained judgment of the market in determining
value would take into consideration the possibility of restoring the damaged
property as far as possible to the same relative position in which it stood be-
fore the taking if the cost of such restoration would be less than the increase
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People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Hayward Building Ma-
terials Company55
In this partial taking for highway purposes, the condemnee con-
tended that his expenses in placing on his remaining land improve-
ments similar to those on the condemned land should have been in-
cluded as severance damages.56 The court rejected the contention,
reasoning that this would have permitted the condenee to profit
from the taking. The condemnor had already paid the fair market
value of the improvements and this had been included in the compen-
sation for the land taken. Any further payment for the improvements
would have resulted in a double recovery.57 The court said:
Much of the problem in the case results from a tendency in appel-
lant's [condemnee's] arguments to equate the 'approaches' of expert
witnesses with the rule of measure of damages in severance matters.
As we have pointed out, the two are distinct. Appellant seeks to
engraft on the settled rule of severance damages an additional pro-
vision for the recovery of costs of restoration.58
People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Flintkote Company59
This case is quite similar to the hypothetical raised earlier. In
Flintkote the state divided the condemnee's quarry by constructing a
highway through it. The condemnee asserted that the cost of restor-
ing the conveyor system connecting the two portions of his land was
the proper measure of his severance damages, independent of any
loss in fair market value of the remaining land.
The court rejected this contention and held that loss in fair mar-
ket value-which in this case was based on an appraiser's evaluation
of prior and subsequent rental values 6 -was the proper measure of
in market value which it would bring to the land, the condemnor is entitled
to the adoption of the criterion of damage which produces the smaller result."
55 213 Cal. App. 2d 457, 28 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1963).
50 An analogous situation is found in Wray v. Knoxville, L.F. & J.R.R.,
113 Tenn. 544, 551, 82 S.W. 471, 473 (1904). In that case the court said: "It
will be noted that just compensation for property taken is provided by the
constitution. Incidental benefits and damages are creatures of statute, and
are in addition to the compensation provided by the constitution and separate
from it."
57 Accord, United States ex rel. TVA v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F.
Supp. 811, 819 (E.D. Tenn. 1941): "If the state rule is to be so taken, then
the inevitable result would be that the landowner would twice receive inci-
dental damages, either in cash compensation or partly in cash and partly in
incidental benefits. That type of so-called compensation is and must be
grounded upon a statutory provision setting up an artificial measure based
upon neither justice nor the settled conception of the meaning of the word
'compensation'."
58 People ex rel. Department of Pub. Works v. Hayward Bldg. Materials
Co., 213 Cal. App. 2d 457, 469, 28 Cal. Rptr. 782, 789 (1963).
59 264 A.C.A. 115, 70 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1968).
60 See generally CAL. EVmENCE CODE § 819; ScmauTz & RAMS, supra note
3, at 42 for an explanation of the Market Rate of Return Analysis which is
the method used to determine fair market value in this case.
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severance damage. The final determination was that no severance
damages should be awarded because the condemnee had been negotia-
ting to rent the severed land to another quarrier and the highway had
resulted in no loss in fair market value to the land for rental pur-
poses.01 In Flintkote, therefore, the condemnee was prevented, and
rightly so, from profiting from the condemnation.
All three of the above cases reached an equitable result under
their individual fact situations. The holdings in all three cases also
were consistent with the judicially construed intent of the eminent
domain clause of the California Constitution.6 2 The balance between
compensation of the landowner and prevention of overpayment by
the state was maintained.
Protection of the State v. Protection of the Individual
Undoubtedly the utility of the fair market value standard in
achieving a proper balance between the individual and the state is
one of the reasons for the courts' adherence to it. One author, stress-
ing the elasticity of this standard, has commented:
"The law" as embodied in the cases has by no means invariably held
to market value and . . . what the law has generally adapted is a
single form of words rather than a single standard of value. 63
However, not all authors have stressed the balancing of interests
between the individual and the state. For example, it has been sug-
gested by one author that this standard should be maintained, as
opposed to costs of restoration, simply because the courts would
thereby be better able to protect the state coffers from indiscrim-
inate expenditure.6 4
Paradoxically, the ordinary elasticity of the fair market value
standard can lead the courts to rely upon it even when it does not
result in a balancing of interests. As was seen in the hypothetical,
the balance is lost when the costs of restoration do occur and are not
reflected in the fair market value paid for the land taken, nor in
the evaluation of the decline in market value of the land retained. In
61 See also Evans v. Wheeler, 209 Tenn. 40, 348 S.W.2d 500 (1961); Note,
Compensation for a Partial Taking of Property: Balancing Factors in Emi-
inent Domain, 72 YALE L.J. 392 (1962).
62 Los Angeles v. Harper, 139 Cal. App. 331, 334, 33 P.2d 1029, 1030
(1934).
63 1 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION or PROPERTY 413 (1937). See also 4 NICHOLS
§ 14.24, at 556-57: "[T]he impracticability of attempting to enumerate all
the possible elements of damage to remaining land that may be recovered is
illustrated by a case involving the taking of land for a railroad in which it
was held that the tendency of gophers or squirrels to propagate on a railroad
location may be considered as an element of damage to the remaining land,
so far as it affects market value. .. ."
64 Palmore, Damages Recoverable in a Partial Taking, in [1968] Izsii-
TuTE ON EMnENT DomAI 55, 67 (the commentator emphasizes the preven-
tion of double recovery of damages).
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such instances, the courts do not deny the existence of damage, they
simply deny its compensability under the fair market value stand-
ard by classifying the damage as incidental.65
The net effect of such treatment is to afford greater protection
to the state than is offered to the individual. This effect is anoma-
lous since the provisions for just compensation in the various state
constitutions 6 are modelled after the just compensation provisions of
the fifth amendment.67 Further, the fifth amendment is a part of the
Bill of Rights: that part of the Constitution specifically designed to
protect the rights of the individual against the imposition of govern-
ment!68
Conclusion
This note has recognized the consideration of costs of restoration
as supporting evidence to be employed in a determination of the loss
in fair market value in a partial taking. It has also attempted to
show that in certain situations costs of restoration should be compen-
sable without regard to the fair market value standard. While the
use of the fair market value standard, when costs of restoration have
been asserted, was seen to be justifiable in that it prevented double
compensation and profiteering, the hypothetical situation illustrates
the fallacy of a complete ban on compensation for incidental damages
of this type.
In California neither the constitution 9 nor the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure 70 requires that damages be ascertained by the fair market
65 See, e.g., United States v. 257.654.tAcres -of Land, 72 F. Supp. 903, 914
(D. Hawaii 1947): "There can be no doubt thatby these thirteen piecemeal
takings... the Company has suffered a fatal blow....
"But this, it must be remembered, is an action at law confined under
Fifth Amendment to rigid rules requiring the Government to pay just com-
pensation only for what it takes. Equitable principles, no matter how well
founded, are rendered inoperative in a condemnation proceeding."
00 Either by express provision or by implication, all of the states provide
in their constitutions for just compensation in eminent domain proceedings.
See note 2 supra.
67 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
08 Concerning the protection accorded the individual by the eminent do-
main clause of the fifth amendment, see Comment, Eminent Domain Valua-
tion in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 67-68
& n.31 (1957), quoting D. BREWER, PROTECTION TO PrVATE PROPERTY FROM
PUBLIC ATTACK 21 (Yale Law Library Pam. No. 42 1891): "There remains to
the individual a sacred and indestructible right of compensation. If, for the
public interests and at the public demands, he sacrifices his time, his labor or
his property, or any value therein, he has a right to demand and must receive
at the hands of the public compensation therefor." Interestingly, Mr. Justice
Brewer later delivered the opinion in Monongahela.
69 See CAL. CoxsT. art. I, § 14.
70 See CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 1248(2); Los Angeles v. Tower, 90 Cal. App.
2d 869, 872, 204 P.2d 395, 397 (1949): "Except for the guarantee of a jury
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value standard. While both require "just compensation," neither one
specifies a procedure for measuring such compensation. As to sever-
ance damages, the Code simply requires that assessment shall be made
of "the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be
condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be
condemned . *... " 1 The path is clear for the courts to decide, at
their discretion, what would be the best method of computing these
damages.
It is submitted that the fair market value standard, by reason of
its flexibility and general fairness, should continue to be the basic
standard for measuring severance damages in California. Costs of
restoration, however, should be recognized as a valid substitute when
loss in fair market value does not result in just compensation to the
condemnee. The balance between protection for the landowner and
protection for the state then could be effected by judicial supervision
or legislative preconditioning of such an award on the actual incur-
rance of such restoration costs. The landowner would thereby be
compensated for damage to his property and, at the same time, would
be prevented from benefiting by the condemnation. In this way the
objective of just compensation could be more equitably met and more
fully carried out in California.
Girard R. Courteau*
trial, section 14 [of the California Constitution] does not purport to specify
the procedure by which the amount of the owner's compensation is to be
determined."
71 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1248(2).
* Member, Second Year Class.
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